Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic,
Berlin, January 1976.
Ministry for State Security.

The Minister

Secret Document

MfS 008 No. 100/76
No. 0011 Version 30 sheets

Guideline No. 1/76
on the Development and Processing of Operational Procedures Operativer Vorgang (OV)

1. The goal-oriented development of operational processes

1.1. The systematic, focus-oriented development of source materials for operational processes of high security policy importance.

1. The goal-oriented development of operational processes

1.1. The systematic, focus-oriented development of source materials for operational processes of high security policy importance

To fulfill the tasks assigned to the Ministry for State Security (MfS)
by the party and state leadership,
the development of source material for operational procedures
must primarily focus on securing and addressing *key political*-operational areas.

This includes,
if information about hostile or negative activities becomes known
outside of previously identified key political-operational areas,
systematically developing this information into source material
for operational procedures or otherwise clarifying it.

It *must* be ensured that all *indications* of hostile or negative activities are *identified promptly and addressed* with *focused* attention.

The managers must ensure that
starting materials for operational procedures are developed
primarily where

- hostile attacks could pose the greatest dangers to the internal security of the GDR;
- the enemy, according to our information, is highly likely to attack and cause significant damage;
- hostile and negative actions, influences and dangers, as well as other phenomena that disrupt and inhibit social development, are to be combatted *offensively*;
- to *preventively eliminate* conditions and circumstances that *favor* harming the GDR or the misuse, exploitation and involvement of GDR citizens in hostile activities.

The systematic development of source materials for operational procedures requires a thorough and comprehensive *political*-operational understanding of the key *political*-operational areas.

It must meet the following requirements:

1. The comprehensive deepening of knowledge about the security policy significance of the political-operational priority areas, in particular with regard to their importance for fulfilling the tasks set by the party and state leadership and the hostile attacks or hostile-negative actions directed against the *political*-operational priority areas in the past.

2. Identifying the areas, processes, groups of people and individuals who, within the political-operational focus area, have significant influence on the planned implementation of the key societal tasks, for which there is operationally significant information and who, for other reasons, are the focus of expected hostile attacks.

3. Ensuring a *constant* overview of *all*
operational materials,
personnel control files,
operational processes, and
other materials *related to* the *political*-operational focus area within that area.

Political-operational **work results,**
in particular the results of clarifying the question
"Who is who?" in the political-operational focus area, and
their exact analysis.

The deployment of
IM (Unofficial collaborators) and GMS (Social workers for security)
in the political-operational penetration of
the political-operational priority areas
should focus on identifying and highlighting

- *Indications of* hostile-negative actions;
- Persons or groups of people in the political-operational priority areas on which the enemy concentrates and through which he tries to enforce his plans, intentions and measures, and
  - the enemy's possibilities (ways, connections, contacts) to influence and be effective on these groups of people;
- favorable conditions and circumstances for the execution and concealment of hostile-negative acts;
- imperialist intelligence services and other hostile centers, organizations and forces that operate against the political-operational focus area;
- areas, processes, groups of people and persons in the political-operational priority area who are of particular importance for ensuring security and order as well as fulfilling the priority societal tasks;
- *Indications of* operationally significant incidents, dangers and situations, and persons associated with them.

Based on the information gathered,
the heads of the operational service units
must issue specific instructions to their subordinate heads and operational staff.

- which areas, processes, groups of people and individuals who have significant influence on the fulfillment of key societal tasks within the political-operational focus area must be secured in the long term and continuously through the *concentrated* deployment of operational forces and resources;
- where and when priority is given to developing source materials about which persons or facts to defend against hostile-negative actions;

- where and when, in the presence of indications of the planning, preparation and execution of terrorist or diversionary crimes, of trafficking in persons hostile to the state, unlawful departure from the GDR, violent crimes and serious military offenses, it is necessary to initiate immediate measures to prevent them in a timely manner;
- on the basis of which already condensed and verified starting materials an operational procedure is to be established;
- where, when and how information is to be passed on to other state and economic governing bodies, companies, combines and institutions, as well as social organizations and forces, for the initiation of effective preventive measures.

The necessary political-operational tasks and measures
for the development of operational processes
are to be included in the work plans of the service units
in accordance with Directive No. 1/70.

To create the conditions
for developing source materials for operational processes,
a continuous analytical assessment (inventory)
of the effectiveness of operational forces and resources,
particularly those of the IM (Unofficial collaborators) and GMS (Social workers for security),
must be carried out,
focusing on the key political-operational areas.

The primary objectives of this assessment are
to develop the following:

- which IM (Unofficial collaborators) and GMS (Social workers for security) are
  - available for the targeted development of starting materials for operational procedures;
- with
  - which tasks the IM (Unofficial collaborators) and GMS (Social workers for security) have been deployed so far,
  - what possibilities exist and
  - what political-operational results have been achieved so far
- by the IM (Unofficial collaborators) and GMS (Social workers for security);
- what specific status has been reached
  - in the planned qualification of IM (Unofficial collaborators) and GMS (Social workers for security)
  - for the development of starting materials for operational processes.

Based on these assessments,
the heads of the operational service units must determine

- how operational forces and resources,
  - in particular the IM (Unofficial collaborators) and GMS (Social workers for security),
- are to be used for the preventive prevention and detection of hostile-negative actions;
- which measures need to be initiated
  - for the further qualification and profiling of IM (Unofficial collaborators) and GMS (Social workers for security);
- how to close existing gaps in securing key political-operational areas,

- in particular through the targeted recruitment of suitable IM (Unofficial collaborators) and GMS (Social workers for security);
- how to unlock existing opportunities for the development of operational processes.

These stipulations *must* be included in the work plans and processing concepts for the political-operational priority areas and *must* contain the necessary responsibilities and deadlines.